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Abstract
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development addresses democracy in Sustainable Development Goal
16 recognizing the indivisible links between peaceful societies and effective, accountable and inclusive
institutions. Sustainable Development Goal 16 calls on UN Member States to promote responsive,
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making, and to build effective, accountable and
transparent institutions at all levels. Thus, Elections are an integral part of the Sustainable Development
Goal 16: “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” offer specific guidelines to tackle imperative challenges
such as building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; guaranteeing election integrity and
trust; and ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.
In Lebanon, the new electoral law adopted a proportional system with a preferential vote and divided
Lebanon into 15 constituencies. Referring to the Goal 16 "Peace, Justice and Effective Institutions", the
paper aims to address the political representation issue in Lebanon, and its connection with the division of
constituencies. Furthermore, the paper will demonstrate that the proportional electoral system adopted for
the 2018 elections did not allow a mitigation of the repercussions of the divisions on the electoral results,
but rather widely amplified them.
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ABSTRACT: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development addresses democracy in
Sustainable Development Goal 16 recognizing the indivisible links between peaceful
societies and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. Sustainable Development
Goal 16 calls on UN Member States to promote responsive, inclusive, participatory and
representative decision-making, and to build effective, accountable and transparent
institutions at all levels. Thus, Elections are an integral part of the Sustainable Development
Goal 16: “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” offer specific guidelines to tackle
imperative challenges such as building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions;
guaranteeing election integrity and trust; and ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory
and representative decision-making at all levels. In Lebanon, the new electoral law adopted
a proportional system with a preferential vote and divided Lebanon into 15 constituencies.
Referring to the Goal 16 "Peace, Justice and Effective Institutions", the paper aims to
address the political representation issue in Lebanon, and its connection with the division of
constituencies. Furthermore, the paper will demonstrate that the proportional electoral
system adopted for the 2018 elections did not allow a mitigation of the repercussions of the
divisions on the electoral results, but rather widely amplified them.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Democracy covers the entire citizen participation mechanism in the decision-making process,
including the decision-making itself. To advance democracy, it is appropriate to recommend that
measures be taken to ensure the emergence of citizenship in all its aspects – political, economic and
social – through a set of specific rules and an effective education system. In addition, the right of
citizens to take part in the conduct of public affairs can be guaranteed by a wide range of
consensual democratic political mechanisms including political pluralism, freedom of expression,
freedom and pluralism of press, and the organization of democratic, free, transparent and fair
elections. In fact, there is a close link between democracy and development. Indeed, democracy and
development come together in the ideal of a sustainable future and their challenges are intertwined.
Democracy, to consolidate, must find its extension in economic and social measures. Conversely,
development strategies, in order to be implemented, need to be validated by the democratic
participation of citizens. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents a universal call
to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure worldwide peace and prosperity. Since the
adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015, development
experts, statisticians and various organizations have discussed the implementation, follow-up and
review mechanisms for monitoring progress on the implementation of the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). (Progress of Goal 16 in 2019, 2019).
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In fact, the democratic dimension of sustainable development cannot be reduced to vague
techniques of "concertation", simple components of support for a public action conceived before
any citizen involvement and generally intended for political display purposes. (Depaquit, 2006).
Accountability to citizens, and accountability through democratic political processes in particular,
is a crucial enabler of the SDGs. Further, democratic accountability can help make the SDG
monitoring framework truly people-centered; this is particularly evident with, but not limited to,
SDG 16. (IDEA Policy Brief, July 2017). The periodic organization of free and transparent
elections is the criteria mostly used to assess the democratic nature of a political regime. However,
although elections are an indispensable criterion for measuring the liveliness of a country's
democracy, they alone are not enough.
In fact, even if the link between the legitimacy of a democratic country and elections appears to
be mutually exclusive, legitimacy itself remains heavily tied to the electoral system utilized.
Essentially, legitimacy is based on two ideas: to better represent citizens and to ensure greater
participation on their part. The logic of reform, by advocating the addition of an element of
proportionality to the electoral system, seeks to ensure the participation of citizens through better
and inclusive representation mechanisms. It is assumed that better representation leads to greater
participation.
However, in Lebanon, political legitimacy is not tied to electoral results. Legitimacy, in fact, is
the result of the confessional balance and power-sharing. Thus, the question that arises is how much
electoral reform could in this case lead to better representation, greater participation, and a real
change in the political system.
In that regard, the Lebanese parliamentary elections that took place on May 6, 2018 were a
turning point in the country’s electoral history. They put an end to the longest electoral hiatus since
the Civil War and was conducted on a new electoral law that went into effect in 2017. Accordingly,
and after 4 decades of a majoritarian electoral system (since 1960), the country witnessed the first
elections in its history under a proportional electoral system. The implementation of the
proportional system was a result of the continuous lobbying of numerous political parties and civil
society actors since the 1970s. (Mourad, 2018)
On June 17, 2017, after a year of discussions between the different political parties, the Lebanese
Parliament adopted the bill that was submitted by the Lebanese cabinet. Prior to that, the parliament
witnessed a deadlock upon the expiration of its mandate and had to extend its mandate twice, up
until a political agreement between major political parties was reached, filling in the presidential
void in 2016. The agreement set up a conducive environment for the ruling political parties to come
to an agreement regarding the electoral law. The new law adopted a proportional system with a
preferential vote and divided Lebanon into 15 electoral districts.

2. SDG
16:
THE
CORRELATION
BETWEEN
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT,
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
Without expressly mentioning it, The SDGs address democracy in Sustainable Development
Goal 16 and recognize the indivisible links between peaceful societies and effective, accountable
and inclusive institutions. SDG 16 tackles an omission of the MDGs, that of governance, inclusion,
participation, rights and security. The Goal’s aim is to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and
inclusive institutions at all levels.” In fact, the issue of governance was long considered to be
outside the realm of mainstream economics and public policy, but it has gradually made its way to
the core of the discipline over the past twenty years and more broadly found its place on the agenda
of the international development community where it is now a central issue. (IDEA Policy Brief,
July 2017).
The emphasis placed on the notion of governance has raised doubt over the paradigm it
sometimes appears to promote, particularly when used to challenge the role of the State
(Abrahamsen, 2000; Chevallier, 2003). Nevertheless, the focus of governance on the quality of
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institutions, issues of participation and accountability in development policies has inspired change,
despite the critical distance necessary with the usage of this notion. (Cling & Razafindrakoto &
Roubaud, 2018).
In reviewing the negotiation process around SDG 16, the experts highlight the difficulties and
concerns of different actors in understanding governance. Examining the process that led to the
adoption of the Objective helps to better understand why it was ultimately less ambitious than
imagined at first (in terms of democracy and elections in particular) and why the objectives chosen
are sometimes vague, disparate and somewhat ineffective. (Cling & Razafindrakoto & Roubaud,
2018). Helen Clark, former Administrator of UNDP, said that "development partners should
consider investing in the implementation of SDG 16 and its goals as a top priority." She stressed
that SDG 16 was "the most hotly disputed" during the UN member states' negotiations. She
continued: "Progress on SDG 16 will not be fast, and in some countries, we are seeing a
regression..." Despite these shortcomings, it is clear that SDG 16, however flawed, can potentially
be used as a lever to advance fundamental freedoms and democratic reforms. (Smith, 2018).
Nonetheless, the different sub-goals that make up SDG 16 are set out below. Because of our
focus on participatory democracy and governance, we are particularly interested in two of these,
namely:
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
Thus, Elections are an integral part of the Sustainable Development Goal. In Lebanon, SDG 16
can create impact by developing inclusive political processes to improve citizen participation, voice
and accountability through electoral processes, civic engagement and political participation, with a
special focus on groups experiencing significant marginalization.

3. THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW IN LEBANON 44/2017: A HISTORIC TURNING POINT
IN THE ELECTIONS IN LEBANON
After five years of delay and three extensions of Parliament's mandate, parliamentary elections
were finally held on 6 May 2018. These elections were conducted under a new electoral law which
included, among others, 15 constituencies and a system of elections. proportional representation
with a preferential vote. In terms of political participation, the 2018 parliamentary elections were
characterized by a relatively low participation rate of 49.7% at the national level, the highest being
Beirut 1 (33.19%) and Mount Lebanon 1 (67.09%). With an estimated number of more than one
million non-resident voters, voter turnout has remained lower than in previous elections (52% in
2009).
The new electoral law reduces the number of constituencies from 26 to 15. Their size varies: the
smallest in the south of the country has five seats, while the largest, the Chouf-Aley south of Beirut,
counts 13. Within each constituency, the seats are distributed among all religious communities,
according to the demographic weight of each in this constituency. The electoral law also introduces
the concept of "preferential voting". Voters will choose from their chosen list their favorite
candidate among the other registrants.
The new system defines an electoral coefficient which
serves as the eligibility threshold and below which the lists are eliminated. To calculate it, the
number of valid votes in a given constituency is divided by the number of seats in play.
The distribution of the number of seats between each of the "winning" lists is proportional,
according to the percentage of votes they have obtained. Then, the allocation of seats within each
list is made according to the denominational quotas and the number of "preferential votes" obtained
by the candidates.
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3.1 The New Electoral Law in Lebanon 44/2017: A Historic Turning Point in the Elections
in Lebanon
To start with, constituency divisions are split into four components: Mouhafaza, Caza,
partial Caza and combined Cazas. In fact, this division is what has defined the electoral process in
Lebanon. It is essentially variable and highly compliant to the interests of political parties and
forces, authorities, as well as opposition figureheads or coalitions. Certainly, the constituency
division patterns aim to achieve different election results. However, this does not mean that they
are likely to help attain the desired results. (Mourad, 2018).
It is worth mentioning that in light of the provision of the Lebanese Constitution, which warrants
power sharing that is equal among Muslims and Christians and proportional between religious
communities, it is difficult to tackle subjective and equal constituency division. In fact, with the
demographic shifts caused by changing geographic concentrations of major groups, or religious
communities, these results are almost impossible to achieve. The divisions’ main aim, namely
after 1992, is to consider proportional and equal distribution of electoral seats between Christians
and Muslims and among all their respective sects. Some constituencies do not reflect any of the
foundations upon which the constituency-dividing mechanisms were built. For instance,
protecting the equality between religious quotas leads to inequality among voters. This is
reflected by the inconsistency in the numbers of voters and seats in every district.
Certainly, there are difficulties in achieving a completely equitable division due to the absence
of constituencies with evenly distributed voters, the inability of administrative and map divisions
to provide voter equality and the lack of a demarcation process that satisfies the aspirations of all
political parties. However, what can be stated in this respect is that the multiple countries that
have aimed to bridge the gap between correct representation and voting power in different
constituencies in order to achieve an appropriate proportional balance have each had a different
recipe resulting from their own electoral specificities and experiences.
Therefore, the standards that govern the general grounds on which constituency demarcation is
built varies from country to another, where the process either depends on a demographic criterion
or a geographic one. On the other hand, some countries reevaluate constituency demarcation
based on the results of previous elections. This standard may not be common practice for States
regarding the constituency demarcation process. It is, however, the greatest concern for
competing parties. Thus, political parties often approach constituency demarcation based on the
results of previous elections which they use to define their stance for re-demarcation for
upcoming elections. (Mourad, 2018)
This standard is a governing factor for the constituency demarcation process in Lebanon, and
any attempt for a reappraisal of successive laws is often conducted based on such standard since
there is a constant desire to study the results of past elections when undertaking a re-demarcation.
3.2 Gerrymandering Strategies Following the Taif Agreement
The fourteenth parliamentary elections in Lebanon’s history, which were conducted in 1992,
post-Civil War era, ended the rein of the 1972 parliament, which remained in place for twenty
years through eight mandate extensions. More so, the electoral Law 154 that entered into force in
1992 was the first blow to the Taif Agreement. In fact, Law 154 did not comply with Taif
provisions to maintain the Mouhafaza as a constituency because it merged the South and
Nabatieh Mouhafazat into one constituency, divided Mount Lebanon into six and the Beqaa into
three. It therefore hindered voter equality, resulting in wide gaps in constituency sizes. (Mourad,
2018)
The strategies of Gerrymandering in Lebanon are explained by a chronic instability in the
division of constituencies, clearly showing that the case has always been that of electoral
optimization "à la carte". In 1996, the new electoral Law 530 entered into force without amending
the number of parliamentary seats which remained at 128. It did, however, reduce the number of
constituencies to ten, but remained in violation of what the Taif Agreement supposedly dictated
as it still merged the Mouhafazat (Nabatiyeh/South into one constituency), divided others (Mount
Lebanon into six constituencies) and merged Beirut into one constituency.
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In 2000, another law, Law 171, was implemented. According to this law, the constituencies were
divided into fourteen (three constituencies in Beirut as well as Beqaa; two constituencies in the
North as well as in the South; four constituencies in Mount Lebanon). The gap between electoral
constituencies persisted although more narrowly in comparison with the previous laws.
In 2008, the Lebanese Parliament implemented electoral law 25/2008, an amended version of
the 1960 law, which returns to dividing constituencies based on medium-sized ones on the scale
of Cazas. The aforementioned law represented a leap in the history of electoral laws as it included
a series of reforms, some of which regulated electoral spending and established the Supervision
Committee for electoral campaigns.
As a result of this gerrymandering strategy post-Taif agreement, the electoral law had been
amended for each election in a manner that caters to both direct and indirect political interests of
political leaders in order to guarantee a wider political representation for themselves and exclude
competitors.
3.3 A Subjective Division of Constituencies Under Law 44/2017
In light of the new law (44/2017), these new divisions were not undertaken in an objective
and normative context, but rather designed to cater greatly to the major political leaders and sects
they represent. The constituency-division mechanism of this law posed two major issues on
political representation: on one hand, it lacks standardization in constituency division, and on the
other, it creates inequality in the number of seats, and consequently in the power of vote of each
citizen. (Mourad, 2018)
The Law divided Lebanon into fifteen uneven constituencies, differing in administrative
division and size. It is also important to note that some constituencies were divided into smaller
districts where the rights of the electorate were limited to casting a preferential vote to one of the
same district’s candidates.
The purpose of this gerrymandering is not only technical; it presents proof of consensus
among political blocs, reflects bargains between them and conforms to the degree of their
influence. More specifically, this configuration seeks to control preferential votes and to prevent
the votes of sectarian or political minorities in a given electoral district from exerting influence.
This subdivision was justified by the fact that the law has imposed the preferential vote at the
level of the small constituency, which explains the maneuvers for a variable electoral division.
Small constituencies have been added to the larger ones to raise the electoral coefficient, without
affecting the preferential vote, and thus prevent adverse lists from breaking through.

4. THE LIMITED EFFECT OF PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM ON THE POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION
Despite the many changes adopted for carving out electoral districts in Lebanon, the majoritarian
representation system in the successive Lebanese election laws prevailed from the very first
parliamentary elections of the Lebanese Republic (from 1860 till the adoption of Law No. 44 of
2017). The adoption of the majoritarian system had a direct effect on the legitimacy of representation
for all segments of the Lebanese society, which is based on ethnic, sectarian or confessional and
regional diversity. (Mourad, 2018)
With the adoption of the proportional system for the May 2018 elections, this great shift in
political representation was anticipated. According to the first article of the law, Lebanon will shift to
a proportional system in order to distribute seats over various political forces. During the first phase,
seats are distributed proportionally over electoral lists that were able to secure a number of votes
greater than the electoral quotient (qualified lists). Then begins the second phase, where the names of
successful candidates are determined for every list by counting preferential votes earned. However,
results have proved that the configuration of electoral districts and the electoral system have crucially
impacted the political representation and electoral behavior of citizens.
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4.1. The effect of a high and variable electoral quotient on representation
In addition to the configuration of districts, which has helped assign a big number of seats
under the direct impact of collective voting, the electoral quotient is considered one of the most
important factors undermining the concept of proportionality in this law. The electoral quotient is
the threshold that a list must secure in order to win one or more seats, implying that lists that do
not reach it are eliminated and obtain no seats.
In this law, the electoral quotient is calculated by dividing the number of valid votes (including
blank votes) over the number of seats in a given district. The number resulting from this division
equation determines the electoral quotient based on the seats being distributed. Whoever obtains
one quotient wins one seat, and whoever obtains several quotients wins several seats. In principle,
the quotient is usually fixed in all systems based on proportionality (at a rate of 2%, 5%, 10%).
The quotient is problematic on two levels: on one hand, the quotient is not fixed as it varies
depending on the number of seats in a given district. This presents an issue regarding the value
given to every citizen’s vote compared to the number of seats, meaning that the number of seats
in every district is neither similar nor equal with votes. A list in Shouf-Aley can win a seat by
simply obtaining 7.69% of votes cast, whereas a list in Sidon-Jezzine would require20%. This is
at the first level.
On the other hand, another problem is revealed with the high electoral quotient. Generally, the
quotient in this law remains, to varying degrees, very high. The quotient reaches its highest, for
example, in the Sidon-Jezzine district that is allocated 5 seats only but requires a quotient of 20%
of votes cast. It is too high for smaller or emergent political forces to secure a seat. Meanwhile, it
reaches its lowest in the Shouf-Aley district with 13 seats. When examining the average adopted
in most electoral systems based on proportionality, one finds that the quotient does not surpass
5% in general. The elevation and variability of the quotient, on one hand, and the effectiveness of
proportionality with regards to the power of the vote, on the other hand, undermine the
anticipated effectiveness of proportionality.
4.2 The effect of the preferential vote counting method on representation
The process of distributing seats over winning candidates begins with all candidates from
qualified lists that have secured the electoral quotient being merged into a single list. The first
seat is given to the candidate that obtains the highest percentage of preferential votes, and the
second to the candidate in second place regardless of the list they belong to. The same applies to
the third seat and until all seats of a district are distributed over candidates belonging to other
qualified lists.
Of course, candidates from a given sect are eliminated from the list once all seats pertaining to
this sect in their district are filled. Candidates from a given list are also eliminated as soon as its
determined seats portion is filled. This can be described as a vertical merger of all candidates
from qualified lists, where those that meet the quotient are merged into one list starting with the
winner of the highest percentage of preferential votes, followed by those who won a decreasing
amount of votes; then, the distribution of seats over candidates takes place.
On that basis, candidates who obtain the highest percentage of preferential votes in their list,
which secured one or more seats, do not necessarily win a seat themselves because candidates are
merged vertically as opposed to seats being distributed horizontally. If the horizontal distribution
of seats were to be adopted, winners from every list would have each earned a seat. This is
directly reflected in political representation, as it has become nearly impossible for some
candidates who belong to major sects to succeed in a specific electoral district. This means that
even if a candidate wins the highest percentage of preferential votes, their seat might be taken by
another candidate from their list who most probably belongs to a minority sect.
This phenomenon forced the political forces to make alliances against nature and transposed
the competition, because of the preferential votes, within the same list, or even the same party,
which disrupted the voters and complicated their choice. Because of what they witnessed during
the establishment of lists of candidates and what they heard during election campaigns, citizens
refrained from participating in the elections, while proportional representation was, on the
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contrary, supposed to encourage them to do it. The electoral coefficient or statutory eligibility
threshold, that is the minimum number of votes that allows a list to obtain a given number of
seats, was also variable.
This difference in eligibility threshold distinguishes between candidates and affects the
representation of citizens, especially since the coefficient of 20% (in South Lebanon 3) is
considered to be very high - this would be even the highest proportion in the world - and thus
stands as an obstacle to any change. Justice at the level of representation, which the law was
supposed to provide, is lacking on two axes: the unbalanced distribution of the number of voters
within the constituencies, which caused an imbalance in the representative weight of a same seat.
In South Lebanon 1, this weight corresponded to 24,000 voters against 42,000 in Mount Lebanon
3, for the same seat.
5. CONCLUSION
Without being expressly mentioned, Elections are an integral part of this global effort for a better
future. Sustainable Development Goal 16: "Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions" proposes specific
guidelines to address critical challenges such as building effective, accountable and inclusive
institutions; guarantee electoral integrity and trust; and ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and
representative decision-making at all levels.
In The Road to Dignity by 2030, the UN Secretary-General noted that ‘effective governance for
sustainable development demands that public institutions in all countries and at all levels are
inclusive, participatory and accountable to the people.’ (UN General Assembly 2014). Based on this,
free and fair electoral processes, democratic political parties, all contribute to the implementation of
SDG 16. (IDEA Policy Brief, July 2016). In fact, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 is not
only a catalyst for the 17 SDGs, but also an objective in and of itself. By supporting the peaceful
resolution of conflicts, promoting the rule of law and access to justice and supporting inclusive
participation, we ensure that no one is left behind constitutional reforms, and that credible elections
are held and parliaments are strengthened while ensuring the constructive engagement of civil
society.
Generally, all elections that took place after the Taif Agreement did not contribute to any change in
the behavior of Lebanese voters; on the contrary, it reinforced the concepts of affiliations by adopting
electoral laws that do not represent all constituencies. In fact, these laws did not meet the
international electoral standards and conflicted with the Lebanese constitution. Throughout history,
Lebanese voters have often repeated, “We don’t know those candidates,” or, “We don’t know their
electoral programs.” Yet, their behavior in the elections of 2005, 2009, and 2018 can be described as
voting for programs or lists, to say the least.
In Lebanon, the Law No. 44/2017 has been seen as a positive transition with regards to improving
the accuracy and validity of representation in Lebanon by adopting the principle of proportionality,
which attempts to distribute seats over lists and candidates according to their winning percentage
while terminating the norm of a single list sweeping all seats. In return, election results have shown
that the adoption of this law has allowed to amend electoral representation in a number of districts.
In fact, the new Law provides proportional representation, which is theoretically the best voting
method to achieve a justice of representation by giving everyone the opportunity to take part to the
popular consultation, each according to its political weight, without dismissing anyone. Unfortunately
the effect of proportionality been neutralized in the law. Under the new electoral law, Lebanon was
divided into 15 constituencies considered to be "large”.
The criteria for determining these constituencies, however, were variable: sometimes, it was
Mouhafazat that was adopted (the two constituencies of Baalbeck-Hermel and Akkar), sometimes it
is the Caza (Zahle, Metn and Baabda), and sometimes Cazas were grouped to constitute the same
district (4 Cazas in the district Lebanon-North 4 and two Cazas in the majority of the constituencies).
The criteria for dividing large constituencies into smaller ones were also variable.
Because of the new electoral system, being elected remains limited to political parties that already
have parliamentary representation and prevents emerging political forces (the so-called civil society)
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and traditional opposition parties from overcoming the hurdle of political representation. It has also
weakened the influence of political figures (local leaders) and local forces in favor of centralized
party decision-making in the selection of candidates in various regions.
If the new law was presented as a change that promotes effective, accountable and transparent
institutions, and, as mentioned in the sub-goals that make up SDG 16, the results of the elections
show that the new law did not lead to enhanced inclusive participatory and representative decisionmaking at all levels. In fact, the results of the elections of 2018 showed that the Lebanese political
system is able to absorb and adapt to the reforms of the electoral systems, including the newly
introduced proportional system. It was able to guarantee the renewal of the political ruling class.
The legitimacy of the dominant political class in Lebanon is extra-electoral provident powersharing balance. Since 2005, all the main political parties present in parliament are represented in the
government, which means that the reform of the electoral system will not, by itself, change the
balances that dominate the Lebanese political system.
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